Today, the publication of microdata poses a privacy threat. Vast research has striven to define the privacy condition that microdata should satisfy before it is released, and devise algorithms to anonymize the data so as to achieve this condition. Yet, no method proposed to date explicitly bounds the percentage of information an adversary gains after seeing the published data for each sensitive value therein. This paper introduces β-likeness, an appropriately robust privacy model for microdata anonymization, along with two anonymization schemes designed therefor, the one based on generalization, and the other based on perturbation. Our model postulates that an adversary's confidence on the likelihood of a certain sensitive-attribute (SA) value should not increase, in relative difference terms, by more than a predefined threshold. Our techniques aim to satisfy a given β threshold with little information loss. We experimentally demonstrate that (i) our model provides an effective privacy guarantee in a way that predecessor models cannot, (ii) our generalization scheme is more effective and efficient in its task than methods adapting algorithms for the k-anonymity model, and (iii) our perturbation method outperforms a baseline approach. Moreover, we discuss in detail the resistance of our model and methods to attacks proposed in previous research.
INTRODUCTION
Organizations, such as government agencies or hospitals, regularly release microdata (e.g., census data or medical records) to serve benign purposes. However, such data can inadvertently reveal sensitive personal information to malicious adversaries. Experience has shown that merely concealing explicit identifying attributes, such as name or phone number, does not suffice to protect personal privacy. An attacker may still uncover hidden identities and/or sensitive information, by joining the released microdata attributes with other publicly available data. The set of attributes instrumental to that purpose, such as gender, zipcode, and age, are called quasi-identifiers (QIs). The anonymization problem calls for * Work supported by a Rutgers Business School RRC grant.
bringing the data to a form that forestalls such linking attacks while preserving as much of the original information as possible.
The question of the form the data should be brought to is a subject of inquiry in itself. Past research has tried to formulate a privacy guarantee an anonymized data set should satisfy, using syntactic and perturbation-based methods.
Syntactic anonymization methods typically postulate that microdata be partitioned into a set of equivalence classes (ECs), such that all tuples within an EC be indistinguishable from (or mutually interchangeable with [33] ) each other as far as their QIs are concerned. The models differ in the condition that an eligible EC should satisfy. By k-anonymity, each EC should consist of at least k tuples [29] . In effect, k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure, as it hides each released tuple in a crowd of at least k −1 others, but does not attend to the values of a non-QI sensitive attribute (SA); hence, the privacy regarding such values may be compromised. To address this limitation, ℓ-diversity requires that each EC contain at least ℓ different "well represented" SA values (in a mathematical sense) [22] . Even so, ℓ-diversity fails to protect against attacks arising from an adversary's unavoidable knowledge of each SA value's frequency in a released table. As a rectification to this problem, t-closeness proposes a condition that bounds the cumulative difference between the frequency distribution of SA values in an EC and their overall distribution [20] . Yet, as we will discuss, such a bound fails to provide a meaningful privacy guarantee that lays grounds for effective and human-understandable policy [25] .
Perturbation-based methods add noise to the data so as to achieve a privacy property. The models in [10, 30, 5] impose a bound on an adversary's posterior confidence about a data property in relation to the prior one; however, they measure confidence gain in absolute, not in relative terms. Other noise-adding methods enforce differential privacy [9] , which guarantees that the effect of any particular individual's data on a query result is dominated by the noise; in other words, the result is broadly the same, regardless of whether a certain individual has contributed her true information. Yet, as [6] shows, an individual's SA value can be inferred from differentially private data with non-trivial accuracy, while the added noise can dominate small values in the results of aggregate queries [32] .
In this paper, we propose β-likeness: a robust and intuitive model for microdata anonymization, postulating that an adversary's confidence in a tuple's SA value should not increase in relative terms by more than a threshold after seeing the published data. We accompany this model with two anonymization schemes tailored for its particular requirements: one based on generalization, and one on perturbation; the latter can better handle remote outliers. We experimentally demonstrate that our schemes: (i) provide effective privacy guarantees in a way that state-of-the-art t-closeness schemes cannot; and (ii) are more efficient than competing approaches.
Table 1: Patient records
To forestall these attacks, Li et al. proposed t-closeness, which requires that a cumulative difference of the SA values' distribution within any EC from the one in the overall table does not exceed a given threshold t [20] . The t threshold is meant to constrain the information an adversary gains after seeing a single EC, with respect to that provided by the full released table. Just like ℓ-diversity is open to many ways of measuring the number of "well-represented" values in an EC [22] , the t-closeness model is open to diverse ways of measuring the cumulative difference between the overall SA distribution, P, and that in an EC, Q. One option is the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) [28] . Another proposal [20] first transforms P (Q) to P ( Q) by kernel smoothing, and then calculates the Jensen-Shannon divergence between P and Q as the approximate distance between P and Q. Last, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is used in [27] . Yet these functions all interpret the t threshold as a bound on the cumulative difference between two frequency distributions. Indeed, this interpretation emanates out of the t-closeness model itself [20] . Still, a privacy model should provide grounds for effective and human-understandable policy [25] . Models that bound a cumulative function of frequency differences between distributions fails to provide a comprehensible relationship between the t threshold and the privacy it affords. In particular, such models do not pay due attention to less frequent SA values, which are more vulnerable to privacy exposure; and do not distinguish between positive and negative variation in an SA value's frequency.
We first elaborate on EMD. Assume a data set DB with SA values HIV and Flu. If the overall SA distribution between them is P = (0.4, 0.6), and their distribution in an EC is Q = (0.5, 0.5), then EMD(P, Q) = 0.1. Still, if their overall distribution is P ′ = (0.01, 0.99) and their distribution in an EC is Q ′ = (0.11, 0.89), then EMD(P ′ , Q ′ ) = 0.1 again. Both cases satisfy 0.1-closeness. However, the information gain in the latter case is much larger than that in the former: the probability of HIV rises by 25% from 0.4 to 0.5, but by 1000% from 0.01 to 0.11. In effect, the two cases do not afford the same privacy. This example appears in [20] , where it is noted that EMD does not provide a clear privacy guarantee. In fact, not only EMD, but any function that aggregates absolute differences faces a similar problem, since such functions do not provide maximum relative difference guarantees [14, 13] about individual SA values. In our example, a small relative difference of Flufrequency evens up a large relative difference of HIV-frequency.
K-L divergence [27] and J-S divergence [20, 21] also fail to pay equal attention to all SA values and their relative differences. In our running example, assume a dataset where the overall distribution of HIV and Flu is P = (0.01, 0.99), and their distribution in an EC is Q = (0.03, 0.97). Then the K-L (J-S) divergence between P and Q, is 0.0290 (0.0073), while that between P and Q is 0.0133 (0.0038). Both these alternatives estimate the privacy afforded by Q with respect to P as higher than that afforded by Q with respect to P. However, the confidence for HIV increases only by 25% in the latter case, while it rises by 200% in the former.
Besides, the anonymization schemes in [20] are mere extensions of k-anonymization techniques [17, 18] . They do not cater to the special needs of t-closeness, hence yield low information quality. Recently, [4] proposed an anonymization algorithm specialized for t-closeness, yet did not discuss the limitations of the model itself. Last, the anonymization scheme in [27] uses perturbation and adds noise to the data, damaging their truthfulness.
The privacy model of [10] imposes a bound ρ2 to the posterior probability (i.e., after release) of certain properties in the data, given a bound ρ1 on the prior probability (i.e., before release). This model is modified in [30] , where the posterior confidence should not exceed the prior one by more than ∆. These models measure the absolute confidence gain (i.e., information leak), hence do not sufficiently protect the privacy of infrequent values. For example they treat a probability increase from 60% to 80% as tantamount to an increase from 1% to 21% in absolute terms, while the latter is an increase by 2000% and the former by 33% in relative terms.
Alternative approaches enforce differential privacy [9] . By this model, the data owner adds noise to a query result so as to guarantee that this noisy result would change very little with the variation of a particular individual's data. However, [16] illustrates that differential privacy does not adequately limit inference about an individual's participation in the data generating process. Furthermore, and more importantly for the focus of our work, [6] has recently shown that, even though the effect of any single individual is dominated by the added noise, the noise itself is in turn dominated by the signal emerging from the whole population. Consequently, one can effectively build a Naïve Bayes classifier inferring individuals' SA values with non-trivial accuracy [6] .
A recently proposed distribution-oriented privacy model is δ-disclosure-privacy [3] ; it requires that for any SA value vi with frequency pi in the original table, its frequency in any EC, qi, should be such that log q i p i < δ. Yet this model fails in two respects:
(1) since log(qi) is defined only for qi > 0, δ-disclosure-privacy strictly requires that each SA value in the original table occurs in every EC; (2) given a sufficiently large value of pi and a modest value of δ, δ-disclosure-privacy does not effectively upper-bound qi, hence allows for absolute certainty of one's SA value, which is exactly the kind of leak it is meant to prevent. These properties render δ-disclosure-privacy unnecessarily rigid, in one way, and yet exceedingly lax, in another way. Besides, [3] does not propose an anonymization algorithm tailored for δ-disclosure-privacy; it only points out that the Mondrian k-anonymization algorithm [18] , adapted for δ-disclosure-privacy (as well as for ℓ-diversity and t-closeness), yields high information loss. This negative result is not surprising; after all, Mondrian simply partitions the data to disjoint ECs, hence is ill-suited for models looking into the sensitive values in an EC, as observed in [12] In its conclusions, [3] observes that better anonymization algorithms are needed for those models, but does not provide such algorithms; it focuses on a negative result without attempting to ameliorate it. In this paper, we provide a meaningful distribution-oriented privacy model that avoids the drawbacks of δ-disclosure-privacy and t-closeness, as a well as an anonymization algorithm specifically designed therefor. Thus, our work goes beyond [3] in all these respects.
THE PRIVACY MODEL
This section introduces our privacy model. Our model assumes that the SA distribution in DB is public knowledge, and constrains the SA-related information gained by the table's publication. Table  2 gathers together the notations we use.
The domain of SA Ni
Number of tuples with vi in DB pi = Ni/|DB| Frequency of vi in DB P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm)
Overall SA distribution in DB G Equivalence class Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qm)
SA distribution in G . . , vm} be the SA domain, and P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) be the overall SA distribution in DB. Suppose that Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qm) is the SA distribution in an equivalence class G, formed by tuples from DB. The information gain on any SA value vi ∈ V is D(pi, qi), where D is a distance function between pi and qi.
We say that the information gain on vi is positive, when pi < qi, and negative, when pi ≥ qi. Negative information gain lowers the correlation between a personal record and vi in EC G below that in the whole table. In most cases, such gain enhances privacy. However, there may exist SA values such as heterosexual, for which a reduced likelihood may inadvertently violate privacy. Nevertheless, we assume that the SA domain always includes the negation of such values. Thus, negative information gain on heterosexual always appears as positive gain for homosexual. Therefore, we can directly control the positive gain on the value (such as homosexual) that poses the privacy threat. For a more general case such as marital status, the negative gain on SA value married can imply that an individual is more likely to be divorced or widowed. However, we assume that the SA domain contains all the values of interest. Hence, the relative negative gain of married can be transformed to the positive gains of divorced, and widowed. Based on the above reasonable assumption, we are concerned with positive information gain; negative gain can be treated symmetrically if circumstances demand it (see Section 7) . We define basic β-likeness as follows. DEFINITION 2 (BASIC β-LIKENESS). Given table DB with sensitive attribute SA, let V = {v1, . . . , vm} be the SA domain, and P = (p1, . . . , pm) the overall SA distribution in DB. An EC G with SA distribution Q = (q1, . . . , qm) is said to satisfy basic β-likeness, if and only if max{D(pi, qi)|pi ∈ P, pi < qi} ≤ β, where β > 0 is a threshold.
For a table DB ′ anonymized from table DB to obey β-likeness, all equivalence classes G ⊂ DB ′ have to conform to β-likeness. Contrary to previous models [20, 3, 21, 27] , basic β-likeness clearly quantifies the relationship between the β threshold and positive information gain. Thanks to the maximum-distance threshold it imposes, it inherently safeguards against skewness attacks and semantic attacks [20] . Last, as it clearly distinguishes between positive and negative information gain, and accepts SA values absent from an EC, it allows for more flexibility in anonymization, hence higher information quality, than the closest related model, δ-disclosure-privacy [3] . Apart from specifying a maximum, instead of a cumulative, distance threshold, we should also define the distance function D in an appropriate manner. As we have argued, a measure of absolute difference does not serve our purposes, since it fails to protect less frequent SA values. We opt for relative difference instead, and define the distance function as D(pi, qi) = q i −p i p i . This function obeys the monotonicity property.
The monotonicity property ensures that a union of two ECs yields no larger distance between pi and qi than its united parts. Hence, ECs violating β-likeness can be transformed to follow β-likeness by merge operations. The relative distance function instantiates basic β-likeness by the constraint D(pi, qi) = q i −p i p i ≤ β, where pi and qi are the distributions of any SA value vi ∈ V in the whole table and an EC, respectively. This constraint amounts to an upper bound for the frequency of vi in any EC, qi, namely qi ≤ (1 + β) · pi. Our relative distance function pays due attention to less frequent SA values. However, this function provides a meaningful frequency bound only if (1+β)·pi < 1; it then caters for SA values whose frequency in DB is pi < 1 1+β . In our effort to pay due attention to such less frequent values, we have discriminated against SA values of frequency larger than 1 1+β . Such values can assume frequency 1 in an EC. Thus, an adversary identifying that a person's record is within such an EC can infer the SA value of that person with 100% confidence. The disclosure of such frequent SA values may pose a privacy threat. To address this limitation, we provide a stronger, enhanced definition of β-likeness. The inequality constraint in the above definition implies that qi ≤ (1 + min{β, − ln pi}) · pi. We can then define the upper bound that enhanced β-likeness imposes on the frequency of vi in an EC by function f (pi) = (1 + min{β, − ln pi}) · pi, which can be decomposed as follows.
The first segment of f (pi) is a linear, monotonically increasing function of pi. The second segment is a concave, also monotonically increasing function of pi, with derivative − ln pi. The two segments meet at pi = e −β . In effect, f (pi) is a continuous, monotonically increasing function of pi in (0, 1] with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Intuitively, the second segment bends the function's slope so as not to exceed the maximum value of 1. The monotonicity of f (pi) implies that an EC G following the enhanced β-likeness constraint obeys the following properties:
1. The maximum frequency of an SA value vi in G is less than 1, i.e., f (pi) < 1 for any pi < 1.
2. For two SA values vi and v ℓ , such that pi < p ℓ , the maximum allowed frequency of vi in G is less than that of v ℓ , i.e., f (pi) < f (p ℓ ).
3.
For an SA value vi that is 'infrequent' in table DB, with pi ≤ e −β , its frequency in G is at most β times larger than pi, i.e., qi ≤ f (pi) = (1 + β) · pi.
4.
For an SA value vi that is 'frequent' in DB, with pi > e −β , its frequency in G is at most − ln pi times larger than pi, i.e.,
These properties protect privacy for all SA values: infrequent values receive due attention, while more frequent ones are disallowed from assuming frequency values of 1. The β parameter defines the privacy constraint for less frequent values, as well as the frequency threshold e −β above which the privacy constraint assumes a default form independent of β. This framework applies for any monotonic upper-bound function. Our choice of ln pi is only a convenient choice that confers the desirable properties. As enhanced β-likeness provides more robust privacy than basic β-likeness, in the following we focus on it. Unless otherwise specified, henceforth by β-likeness we mean its enhanced form.
While (enhanced) β-likeness defines only an upper bound on qi, the cognate δ-disclosure-privacy model [3] amounts to two bounds on qi, demanding that log( q i p i ) < δ, or, equivalently, e −δ · pi < qi < e δ · pi. Furthermore, there is a fundamental conceptual difference between β-likeness and δ-disclosure-privacy: the former always disallows qi values equal to 0, and can allow qi values arbitrarily close to 1 (as its upper bound can assume values larger than 1), while the latter allows any qi value less than pi, but always disallows qi values equal to 1 (its upper bound being strictly less than 1). We argue that both these choices are more reasonable than those made by δ-disclosure-privacy. Moreover, we re-iterate that the introduction of δ-disclosure-privacy in [3] was not accompanied by an anonymization algorithm tailored therefor; the model was only used as a tool to argue for a negative result, namely that existing k-anonymization algorithms [18] , adapted to δ-disclosure-privacy, yield unacceptably high information loss [3] . In contrast, our work aims at a positive result.
GENERALIZATION-BASED SCHEME
In this section we first introduce the metrics to measure the information loss by the generalization. Then we present an observation, which motivates our algorithm. After that, we design our generalization-based algorithm customized for β-likeness. 
Information Loss Metrics
To solve the problem posed by the β-likeness model, we need to fulfill the β constraint while giving up little information. We use an information loss metric to assess the amount of information ceded for the sake of privacy. Different utility objectives would require different metrics. When the purpose the data is to be used for is not known in advance, a general metric can be used, as in [12] .
Assume a set of QI attributes QI = {A1,. . ., A d } and an EC G. Given a numerical attribute NA ∈ QI, let [LNA, UNA] be its domain and [l G NA , u G NA ] the (generalized) range of its values in G; then the information loss (IL) regarding NA in G is:
Given a categorical attribute CA, we surmise a generalization hierarchy HCA on its domain ( Fig. 1 ). Let a be the lowest common ancestor of all CA values in G; then, the IL regarding CA in G is:
where leaves(a) is the set of leaves under a, and leaves(HCA) the set of all leaves in HCA. Then the total IL of G is:
where wi is a weight for Ai, with d i=1 wi = 1. In our experiments we set wi = 1 d . The Average Information Loss on a table DB, published as a collection of ECs SG, is:
We aim to attain β-likeness on DB at a low value of AIL(SG).
An Observation
The intuition behind our generalization-based method emanates from the following observation. Assume DB is partitioned into a set of buckets by a 'group-by' on SA. If we form ECs by selecting from each bucket a number of tuples proportional to its size, then the SA distribution in the formed EC will be the same as the global distribution. On the other hand, if we partition DB into buckets allowing (all tuples of) more than one SA value per bucket, and then form ECs in a similar fashion, then there will be some variation in SA distributions among ECs. We aim to configure this process so as to allow for such variation to the extent permitted by the β constraint. An akin methodology is followed in SABRE [4] , an algorithm for the t-closeness model. Yet, unfortunately, SABRE cannot be applied on other distribution-based models, as it caters to the particular requirements of t-closeness, looking at the semantic distance between SA values in order to bound the EMD-difference of distributions between each EC and the overall table. In contrast, our algorithm should bound the variation in each SA value's frequency. The following two definitions clarify our intuition. DEFINITION 4. Given a table DB with sensitive attribute SA, a set of buckets ϕ forms an exact bucket partition of DB iff ∀B∈ϕ B = DB, while each SA value (tuple) appears in exactly one bucket. DEFINITION 5 (PROPORTIONALITY CONDITION). Let ϕ be a bucket partition of DB. Assume that an EC, G, is formed with xj tuples from bucket Bj ∈ ϕ, j = 1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|. G abides to the proportionality condition with respect to ϕ, iff the values xj are proportional to |Bj |, i.e., x1 : x2 : · · · : x |ϕ| = |B1| : |B2| : · · · : |B |ϕ| |. Table 1 , where {weight, age} is the QI, and disease is the SA. The diagram in Figure 2 shows the QI-space and the distribution of tuples, with each QI attribute corresponding to a dimension. A bucket partition ϕ of this table could consist of six buckets of one tuple each, with SA values headache, epilepsy, brain tumors, anemia, angina, and heart murmur, respectively. Taking one tuple from each of those, we could build a single EC satisfying 0-likeness. Still, such an EC covers the entire QIspace, incurring high information loss. An alternative bucket partition could consist of three two-tuple buckets, ϕ = {B1, B2, B3}, with headache and epilepsy in bucket B1, brain tumors and anemia in B2, and the rest in B3. We can then build two ECs, taking one tuple from each bucket, as shown in Figure 2 . Tuples in the same EC are labeled by the same number in the figure. This partitioning achieves better information quality, as the areas of ECs in QI-space are smaller.
While the bucket partition in the above example enables higher information quality, it no longer abides by 0-likeness. Still, it satisfies β-likeness, for β ≥ 1, with respect to Table 1. In general, it suffices to create ECs so that they attain β-likeness for a given β > 0. We propose an algorithm that does so in two phases: it first partitions tuples into buckets, and then determines the number of tuples each EC needs to draw from each bucket.
Bucketization Phase
Let the SA domain be V = {v1, v2,. . ., vm} and the overall distribution of SA values P = (p1, p2,. . ., pm). We partition V into subsets, and use them to divide DB into a bucket partition ϕ; all tuples in DB with SA values in the same subset of V are pushed to a single bucket of ϕ. Assume EC G draws xj tuples from bucket Bj ∈ ϕ, j = 1, 2,. . ., |ϕ|, and let Vj be the subset of SA values in Bj . Then, in the worst case, all xj tuples may have the least frequent SA value in Vj , v ℓ j , with p ℓ j = minv i ∈V j {pi}, hence the frequency of v ℓ j in G will be q ℓ j = x j |G| ; β-likeness should hold in this case too, i.e., it should be 
Theorem 1 defines the eligibility condition for an EC to follow β-likeness. However, it does not provide a way to specify a particular number of tuples xj to choose from a given bucket Bj , i.e., it offers no guidance on how to construct a β-likeness-complying anonymization. To overcome this lack of guidance, we assume that ECs are formed following the proportionality condition. Under this assumption, it holds that 
Lemma 2 defines the condition that the frequencies of a subset of SA values Vj ⊂ V should obey, so that, if all values in Vj are put in the same bucket Bj by a bucket partition ϕ, then ECs obeying the proportionality condition with respect to ϕ satisfy β-likeness. This condition is trivially satisfied by a strict partition having a single SA value per bucket. We aim at a looser bucket partition that satisfies the condition of Lemma 2 in a non-trivial manner, with more than one distinct SA values per bucket (as in Example 1).
Function DPpartition(DB, SA)
Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, P = (p1, p2, . . . , pm); We develop a bucketization scheme for this task. We start out by representing, P, the set of SA frequencies in DB, in ascending order, pi ≤ pi+1, i = 1, . . . , m − 1. By Lemma 2, a set of consecutive SA values in V, v b , v b+1 , . . . , ve, are allowed to be in the same bucket provided that e i=b pi < f (p ℓ ), where p ℓ = min{p b , p b+1 , . . . , pe}. Our scheme, presented in Function DPpartition, partitions V by dynamic programming, so as to minimize the number of buckets. Let N [e] denote the minimum number of buckets to which we can partition the prefix of e elements in V, i.e., v1, v2, . . . , ve. The value of N [e] is calculated recursively as:
DPpartition has two parts. The first part (steps 3-13) runs the DP recursion of Equation 6 to evaluate the final minimum value N [m] and split V into segments accordingly; thereby, it needs to assess the combinability of m 2 potential buckets. To assess combinability, we maintain the running pi within a bucket, updated in O(1) at each step; the min{pi} within a bucket is its first element. The complexity of this part is O(m 2 ). The second part (steps [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] uses the first-part results to build the bucket partition. Tuples with the SA values in the same segment make a bucket (step 18), in O(|DB|). The overall time complexity is O(m 2 + |DB|).
Reallocation Phase
The bucketization phase of our scheme delivers a bucket partition ϕ of DB. We have so far assumed that ECs are formed from ϕ following the proportionality condition. However, a strict adherence to this condition may result in large ECs, incurring high information loss. For example, if the size of some bucket Bj ∈ ϕ is a prime number (other than 2), then, to strictly follow the proportionality condition, we should form an EC out of the whole table.
We should rather relax the condition: it should suffice that the number of tuples xj chosen from bucket Bj in EC G be approximately proportional to the size of Bj , i.e.,
The rationale for this relaxation is as follows: the bucket partition ϕ returned by DPpartition obeys the inequality
if we draw tuples into
ECs approximately proportionally to the size of the bucket they hail from), then the eligibility condition
x j |G| ≤ f (p ℓ j ) (Theorem 1), and therefore β-likeness, will be still easily achievable.
To ensure β-likeness, we determine the EC sizes by constructing a binary tree, the ECTree, in a top-down fashion. We start with a bucket partition ϕ = {B1, . . . , B |ϕ| }. The root of the tree r represents a potential EC that contains all tuples in DB, i.e., |Bj | tuples from bucket Bj . We denote these contents as r = |B1|, . . . , |B |ϕ| | . This can be a valid EC, but we prefer smaller ones. Thus, we proceed to split r into two children (each representing an EC), dividing each Bj into B 1 j and B 2 j . The root's left child cL contains B 1 j and the right child cR contains B 2 j , j = 1, 2, . . . , |ϕ|. To ensure that B 1 j and B 2 j have approximately the same size, we set |B 1 j | = round
The split is allowed only if both cL and cR satisfy the eligibility condition (Theorem 1), hence can form ECs satisfying β-likeness. Assume the left child of r is cL = |B 1 1 |, . . . , |B 1 |ϕ| | . Then, for the eligibility condition to be satisfied, it should hold that [5, 6, 8] in Figure 3 represents an EC with 5 tuples from B1, 6 from B2, and 8 from B3 (i.e., all tuples in the table). We split r into c1 = [2, 3, 4] and c2 = [3, 3, 4] . Then EC c1 has size 9, and contains 2 tuples from B1 with 2 9 < min{f (p1), f (p2)}, 3 from B2 with 3 9 < min{f (p3), f (p4)}, and 4 from B3 with 4 9 < min{f (p5), f (p6)}. Thus, c1 obeys the eligibility condition (Theorem 1). Likewise, c2 also satisfies the condition. Thus, splitting r into c1 and c2 is allowed. Recursively, we can split c1 into [1, 1, 2] and [1, 2, 2]. When we try to split c2 into g1 = [1, 1, 2] and g2 = [2, 2, 2], we find that g2 does not satisfy the eligibility condition, as 2 6 > min{f (p1), f (p2)}, hence this split is not allowed. Figure 3 shows the final tree, with each leaf node indicating the number of tuples an EC should draw from each bucket. In the general case, an EC could also draw 0 tuples from some bucket. [5, 6, 8] [ 
BUREL
We now put the above phases together to devise BUREL, an algorithm that BUcketizes tuples into buckets and REallocates them from buckets to ECs so as to attain β-Likeness. The distinctive and novel feature of this algorithm, as opposed to algorithms for k-anonymity, ℓ-diversity, and t-closeness, is that it distinguishes among SA values by their frequencies and builds its operation and reasoning around this frequency-based partitioning.
The bucketization phase of BUREL returns ϕ, a bucket partition of DB (step 2). Then, its reallocation phase (function biSplit) determines the number of tuples each EC should draw from each bucket at a leaf of the ECTree and returns a list of arrays Sa containing these size values (step 3). Specific ECs following the prescribed sizes are then materialized (steps 4-9). Given an array a ∈ Sa, BUREL retrieves aj tuples from Bj ∈ ϕ, where aj is the j th element of a and j = 1, 2,. . . ,|ϕ|, and forms an EC G out of them (steps 6-8). When retrieving tuples from buckets, BUREL is indifferent to their SA values. The β-likeness between a constructed EC G and the whole table DB is guaranteed by Theorem 1; tuple selection is guided by information loss considerations, as prescribed by our information loss metric (Section 4.1). This metric requires the Minimum Bounding Boxes of ECs to be small. Accordingly, we employ function Retrieve(Bi, ai) (step 7), which greedily picks tuples of similar QI values. This greedy selection of nearby tuples works as follows: We define a multidimensional space with each QI attribute as a dimension. The mapping to such a QI-space for a numerical QI attribute NA is straightforward. The axis of a categorical QI attribute CA is formed by the order provided by a pre-order traversal of the leaves in its domain hierarchy HCA. Each tuple is represented as a point in this QI-space. When forming an EC G, BUREL first randomly picks a tuple x from a bucket of ϕ in G, and then finds the aj nearest neighbors (by Euclidean distance) of x in each bucket Bj, j = 1, 2,. . . ,|ϕ|, and adds them into G, until the size specifications are satisfied. Still, this process can be computationally demanding even with an index structure [8] . Thus, we devise an efficient heuristic using the Hilbert curve [24] , a continuous fractal that maps regions of QI-space, hence tuples, to 1D Hilbert values. Tuples close in QI-space are likely to have nearby Hilbert values. BUREL sorts tuples in Bj by their Hilbert values, and uses this order to select the aj nearest neighbors of a tuple x within each bucket. We find the nearest Hilbert-neighborx of x within bucket Bj by binary search, and then expand to the next closest aj neighbors to x. The average time complexity for this search operation is O |SG||ϕ|· log |DB| |ϕ| + |DB| |S G ||ϕ| , where |ϕ| is the number of buckets, |DB| |ϕ| the average size of a bucket, and |DB| |S G ||ϕ| the average number of tuples drawn from a bucket to form an EC.
PERTURBATION-BASED SCHEME
Our generalization-based solution, achieves β-likeness and also provides identity anonymity, like all generalization-based methods do. However, in case a data set contains a few remote outliers, these outliers may force a highly unsatisfactory solution by generalization. Similarly unsatisfactory solutions can be obtained in case of extremely infrequent SA values. For example, consider a dataset DB, in which only one tuple t has SA value v. Then, to attain 1likeness, we would have to create an EC containing t and at least half of the tuples in DB. We deduce that an alternative solution is desirable in order to handle such irregular cases, even at the expense of identity anonymity. To that end, we propose an approach that anonymizes each tuple independently by perturbing SA values while preserving QI values intact. We reiterate that, for a given SA value vi, β-likeness considers its frequency in the whole table, pi, as prior confidence, and constrains an adversary's information gain on vi after seeing the published data, bounding the posterior confidence. We aim to achieve this target by perturbing SA values only; our scheme resembles a randomized response procedure, albeit having a different perturbation probability for each SA value. DEFINITION 6 (β-LIKENESS BY PERTURBATION). Given a table DB with sensitive attribute SA, let V = {v1, . . . , vm} be the SA domain, and P = (p1, . . . , pm) the overall SA distribution in DB. A perturbation on DB that randomizes SA values satisfies β-likeness, iff the adversarial posterior confidence in vi ∈ V after seeing the randomized data is at most f (pi), i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
To build a solution that achieves β-likeness by perturbation, we adapt the concept of upward (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy [10] as follows. DEFINITION 7 ((ρ1i, ρ2i)-PRIVACY). Let vi ∈ V be an original SA value, and v ∈ V be any SA value after perturbation. We say that (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is satisfied on vi, iff the adversarial prior confidence in vi is C(U = vi) = ρ1i, and the posterior confidence after seeing v is C(U = vi|V = v) ≤ ρ2i.
While (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy does not distinguish among SA values, our adaptation does. Given these definitions, we can achieve βlikeness by setting ρ1i = pi and ρ2i = f (pi) for each vi ∈ V. THEOREM 2. Let vi ∈ V be an original SA value, and v ∈ V be an SA value after perturbation, such that ∃u ∈ V: Pr(u → v) > 0, where u → v denotes that u has been perturbed to v. If it holds that
then (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is satisfied with ρ1i = C(U = vi) > 0.
PROOF. Assume that (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy is not satisfied, that is, C(U = vi|V = v) > ρ2i. For the event of seeing v it holds that C(V = v) = ∀u∈V C(U = u) · Pr(u → v) > 0, as v must have been produced by some original value u. Let vj be an SA value least likely to have been perturbed to v, i.e.:
By the definition of conditional probability it holds that:
and, since vj is least likely to have yielded v, it is:
Since, by our assumption, C(U = vi|V = v) > ρ2i > 0 and C(U = vi) = ρ1i > 0, from Eqs. (8) and (9) we get:
Inequality (7) holds for vj , thus we can rewrite Inequality (10) as:
Still, 1−C(U =v i ) C(U =v i ) = 1−ρ 1i ρ 1i , hence Inequality (11) yields:
which contradicts our assumption.
Due to Theorem 2, Inequality (7) provides a sufficient condition for β-likeness to hold. We aim to achieve this condition by uniform perturbation, which maximizes the utility of randomized data [2] . Given an input SA value vi ∈ V, uniform perturbation tosses a coin with probability αi ∈ (0, 1] for heads and 1−αi for tails, and, in the latter case, replaces vi by a randomly selected value v ∈ V. Then:
LEMMA 3. Given any perturbed value v, Pr(vi → v) is maximized when vi = v.
PROOF. By Equation 12, if vi
For the sake of utility, we need to maximize the probability that input SA values remain unchanged, i.e., to set αi as high as possible for each vi ∈ V. However, for a given vi, the value of αi should allow Inequality (7) to hold for v = vi and for any vj = v; if it holds in these extreme cases, then it also holds for all other values of variables v and vj . Substituting the values given by Equation 12 for v = vi and vj = v in Inequality (7), we get α i +(1−α i )/m (1−α j )/m ≤ γi ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} \ {i}. The worst-case value the denominator in the last inequality (i.e., the probability Pr(vj → v) of perturbing vj = v to v) can assume is CM = min m h=1
1−α h m . To calculate a bound for αi, we require that the inequality holds in the worst case:
Since by definition CM ≤ 1−α i m , if Inequality (13) holds, then, for a given i, it will hold that α i +(1−α i )/m (1−α i )/m ≤ γi; consequently, it will be αi ≤ γ i −1 γ i +m−1 . Using this upper bound of αi, we infer that, for each i ∈ {1, 2,. . ., m} it will be 1−α i m ≥ 1 γ i +m−1 . In effect, it should also be CM = min m h=1
We have thus derived a lower bound for Pr(vj → v) with vj = v, namely C L M = 1 γ ℓ +m−1 . To ensure that Inequality (14) always holds, we must guarantee that it also holds for the lower-bound case; thus, the highest value we can safely assign to each αi is αi = 
Then, by Theorem 2, (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy holds ∀vi ∈ V, hence βlikeness is satisfied.
We now discuss how we reconstruct the original SA distribution from the perturbed data to answer aggregation queries, which are a basis of data mining tasks, as the following [33] : This query has predicates on λ randomly selected QI attributes and the SA. For each of these λ+1 attributes A, pred(A) has the form of A ∈ RA, where RA is an arbitrary interval in the domain of A.
Perturbation does not affect QI values. We reconstruct the query's result by estimating the count of original SA values among those tuples that satisfy the query's QI predicates, given the observed SA values. In particular, given an aggregation query, suppose that St is the set of tuples satisfying the predicates associated with QI attributes, A1 ∈ RA 1 AND . . . 
and estimate the answer to a given query as est = v i ∈R SA n ′ i , where RSA is the query interval of pred(SA). To facilitate this reconstruction process, we publish the perturbed data along with matrix P M ; we can also release the original global SA distribution P in order to render the publication model comparable to that offered by generalization.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate our schemes. Our prototypes were implemented in Java and the experiments ran on a Core2 Duo 2.33GHz CPU machine with 4GB RAM running Windows XP. We use the CENSUS dataset [1], which contains 500,000 tuples on 6 attributes as shown in Table 3 . For categorical attributes, the value following the type is the height of the corresponding attribute hierarchy; for instance, attribute marital status is categorical and has a hierarchy of height 2. The first 5 attributes are potential QI-attributes; the last (salary class) is the SA. By default, we take the first three attributes as QI. The least frequent SA value is 49, with frequency 0.2018%; the most frequent SA value is 12, with frequency 4.8402%; β = 1 produces frequency threshold e −β ≈ 37%, which marks all SA values as 'infrequent', and allows the frequency of any SA value in any EC to be at most 4.8402% × 2 = 9.7%. Thus, 1 is a small β value. We use β ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We generate 5 microdata tables by randomly picking 100K to 500K tuples from the dataset; the one of 500K tuples is our default dataset. We set the likeness threshold β by default to 4. Then, given the application of enhanced β-likeness for any SA value vi, if pi ≤ e −4 = 0.018, its frequency qi in any EC should not exceed 5pi; if pi > 1.8%, then it should be qi ≤ (1 − ln(pi)) · pi. We reiterate that these bounds apply to each SA value, while their definition accommodates both low-frequency and high-frequency values. The highest SA value frequency in our data set does not exceed 5%, so the frequency of any salary class in any EC will not exceed 20%.
Face-to-face with t-closeness
Our first task is to compare our new β-likeness privacy model to the predecessor distribution-based model of t-closeness. We argue that β-likeness provides a more informative and comprehensible privacy guarantee than t-closeness does. Still, in order to create an even playing field on which to compare β-likeness to t-closeness, we conducted three face-to-face comparisons as follows.
In the first comparison, for a given dataset DB and β, we let BUREL transform DB to DB β , satisfying β-likeness. We then measure the closeness t β , by the t-closeness model, between DB β and DB, i.e., the maximum EMD of the SA distribution in an EC of DB β from its distribution in DB. We then apply t-closeness schemes tMondrian [20] and SABRE [4] on DB as well, with terms of t-closeness, we are interested to compare the privacy they ahieve in terms of β-likeness. Figure 4(a) shows the results (in logarithmic y-axes), as a function of the given β parameter. While all the three schemes are tuned to ensure the same t-closeness guarantee, BUREL provides consistently higher privacy by the criterion of β-likeness than SABRE and tMondrian. This result is expected, since t-closeness restricts only the cumulative difference between SA distributions, indifferent to the relative frequency difference of each individual SA value between an EC and the whole table.
Next, for a given dataset DB and closeness constraint t, we let tMondrian (SABRE) transform DB to DB M t (DB S t ), attaining tcloseness. We then let BUREL find, by binary search, a value βt, such that, when it enforces βt-likeness on DB, it produces an anonymization DB βt characterized by the same (or smaller) closeness parameter t as DB M t (DB S t ). Again we get three anonymized versions of DB that achieve the same privacy under t-closeness. While in our first comparison we arrived at this state starting out with a β parameter, now we start out with a t parameter. Thus, we avoid bias against t-closeness schemes. We now compare the β-likeness achieved by DB M t (DB S t ) to that of DB βt , as a function of t. The results, shown in Figure 4(b) , reaffirm our previous findings.
In our last experiment, given an AIL value l, we let BUREL determine, by binary search on its β threshold, a value β l , such that the data set DB β l it generates from DB with β l as the likeness threshold achieves AIL equal to (or smaller than) l. Likewise, we determine, by binary search, a value t M l (t S l ), which, used as the closeness threshold in tMondrian (SABRE), generates data set DB t M l (DB t S l ) with AIL near l too, allowing for a small difference ǫ. Thus, we obtain three data sets DB β l , DB t M l , and DB t S l , generated by BUREL, tMondrian, and SABRE, respectively, which all have information loss near l; to ensure the comparison is not biased in favor of BUREL, we ensure its AIL value is not greater than those of the other algorithms. We then compare the privacy they achieve in terms of β-likeness. Figure 4(c) shows the results. Not surprisingly, BUREL provides the highest privacy again, followed by SABRE and tMondrian.
Our results testify that, other factors being equal, state-of-theart t-closeness schemes fail by a wide margin (as indicated by the logarithmic y-axes) to achieve privacy good in terms of β-likeness. Thus, they reaffirm that β-likeness raises substantially different requirements from t-closeness, and requires a different approach.
Evaluation on Generalization
In this section we evaluate the performance of BUREL as a βlikeness algorithm in its own field. As there is no previous work on β-likeness, we employ two comparison benchmarks adopting some suggestions of related work. First, we devise an algorithm for β-likeness, following the conventional wisdom on designing algorithms for new privacy models: We adapt Mondrian [18] , a k-anonymization algorithm, to the purposes of β-likeness, as previous works have done for other privacy models [22, 20, 3, 21] .
Our adaptation, LMondrian, splits an EC only if both resultant ECs satisfy β-likeness. Second, we use the similar adaptation of Mondrian to δ-disclosure-privacy suggested in [3] , DMondrian. To render DMondrian comparable to BUREL and LMondrian, we set the value of δ so that the data anonymized by DMondrian obey β-likeness. As we have discussed, while β-likeness demands that an SA value's distribution in an EC be qi ≤ (1+min{β,−ln pi})·pi, for a given β, δ-disclosure-privacy requires that e −δ ·pi < qi < e δ ·pi, where pi is the overall distribution of vi in the whole dataset. Thus, an algorithm for δ-disclosure-privacy achieves β-likeness for δ ≤ log(1+min{β,−ln pi}), for all pi; in view of all SA values in V,
. We first compare the three schemes with respect to average information loss and wall-clock time. First, we study performance as a function of the β threshold. Figure 5 shows the results. As β grows, the constraint on the relative difference of each SA (i.e., salary) value frequency between an EC and the overall table is relaxed, hence information quality rises ( Figure 5(a) ). BUREL outperforms both LMondrian and DMondrian in information quality, showing the benefit of a scheme tailored for β-likeness. This result reconfirms the finding of [3] that a k-anonymization algorithm, adapted to δ-disclosure-privacy, yields unacceptably high information loss; as we discussed, we aim at a positive result and propose a better alternative. In addition, given that δ-disclosure-privacy overprotects data by imposing a constraint on negative information gain, LMondrian performs better than its stricter sibling, DMondrian. Remarkably, BUREL also outpaces both Mondrian-based schemes in efficiency ( Figure  5(b) ). Overall, BUREL achieves almost half the information loss of its Mondrian-based competitors in about half the time.
Next, we investigate the effect of QI dimensionality (size), varying it from 1 to 5. As QI dimensionality increases, the data become more sparse in QI space, as more high-dimensional degrees of freedom are offered; thus, the formed ECs are more likely to have large minimum bounding boxes, and information quality degrades, as Figure 6 (a) shows. The information loss of BUREL is again lower than that of the Mondrian-based methods. In addition, BUREL is again the fastest of the three (Figure 6(b) ).
Our next experiment studies the effect of database size, varying the size of the microdata table from 100K to 500K tuples. 6 : Effect of varying QI 7 presents our results. Interestingly, data size has no clear effect on information quality. This is due to the fact that, as the amount of tuples grows, more sensitive values are revealed, imposing their own requirements. The mere increase of data density does not help, as it would with simpler models like k-anonymity. Still, the elapsed time increases as the table size grows; BUREL is again found to be superior in both respects. We now examine the utility of the generalized table by aggregation queries introduced in Section 5. Each predicate pred(A) in the query has the form of A ∈ RA. Let expected selectivity over the table be 0 < θ < 1. Assuming data are uniformly distributed, θ can be achieved if each attribute A selects records within a range of length |A|·θA of its domain, such that (θA) λ+1 = θ. In effect, the length of RA should be |A|·θ 1 λ+1 , where |A| is the domain length of attribute A. Given a query, the precise result prec is computed from the original table, and an estimated result est is obtained from the anonymized table. To calculate est, we assume that tuples in each EC are uniformly distributed, and consider the intersection between the query and the EC. We define |est−prec| prec × 100% as the relative error. We measure the median relative error in a workload of 10K queries. Relative error is undefined when prec is 0. If prec in a query is 0, we drop that query.
In our first experiment, we use the first 5 attributes in Table 3 as QI, with expected selectivity θ = 0.1, and vary the dimensionality of the query, i.e. the number of QI attributes λ on which predicates are defined. As these attributes contribute to the error, the increase of λ exercises a negative effect on error. However, as λ grows, the length of the query range RA in the domain of each queried attribute also grows (for constant θ); thereby, the minimum bounding box of an EC becomes more likely to be entirely contained in the query region. In effect, the error does not depend monotonically on λ (Figure 8(a) ); it does not matter much how many attributes a given selectivity θ is shared among. In the next experiment, we fix λ to 3, θ to 0.1, and vary β. Figure 8(b) shows the results. As β grows, the privacy requirement is relaxed, hence information quality rises and the error drops. Next, we set θ to 0.1, and vary the QI size. As the QI size increases, the data tend to be more sparse in QI-space, hence it is more likely that ECs with bigger bounding boxes are created. Thus, in Figure 8 (c) the workload error increases with QI size, for all compared methods, while BUREL presents the most modest increase. Last, Figure 8(d) presents the results as a function of selectivity θ. As θ grows, the length of the range RA for each attribute in a predicate increases. This makes the minimum bounding box of an EC more likely to be entirely contained in the query region, so the estimate becomes more accurate and the error smaller. BUREL achieves consistently better utility. 
Evaluation on Perturbation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our perturbationbased β-likeness scheme discussed in Section 5. We keep the QI value of each tuple unchanged, and only randomize its SA value according to a certain probability defined in conditional Equation 12 . We emphasize that there does not exist information loss by generalized QI values to examine as with BUREL, but we can study the utility of perturbed data set, again by aggregation queries. However, unlike the query answer estimation for generalized data using an intersection between the query and the EC, now we estimate the result simply by reconstructing the original SA distribution from the perturbed SA values of those tuples that satisfy a query's QI predicates as discussed in Section 5.
Since our β-likeness scheme by perturbation is built on (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy, for the sake of convenience we represent it as (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy. We emphasize that, on the one hand, BUREL is based on generalization, with the desirable property of identity anonymity; on the other hand, (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy randomizes the SA value of each tuple independently, and is thus immune to corruption attacks, in which one may infer the SA value of a victim on condition that they already know the SA values of some individuals [30] . However, BUREL and (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy are mutually incomparable. Besides, there is no previous work that achieves a privacy guarantee comparable to β-likeness by perturbation; the most recent related work that offers a privacy guarantee by perturbation, [5] , is also built on (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy, yet only limits the posterior probability of inferring any individual SA value, a privacy guarantee comparable to ℓ-diversity. In the absence of another competitor, we introduce and compare to a Baseline approach, which publishes the exact QI value of each tuple together with the overall SA distribution in the original table, in the way of Anatomy [33] . Figure 9 shows our results. We first set QI size to be 5, query selectivity θ = 0.1, and vary the number of QI-attributes in the aggregation queries. The QI value of each tuple remains intact for both (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy and Baseline. Thus, only the predicate on SA, pred(SA), incurs an error. As λ grows, the query range interval RSA for SA also increases, in effect more tuples satisfy the query, and the reconstructed SA distribution is closer to the actual one. Therefore, as Figure 9 (a) shows, the workload error decreases as a function of λ. Next, we set λ = 3, θ = 0.1, and study the effect of β. Baseline is independent of β; the small fluctuation of its curve is due to the fact that we randomly generate RA (i.e., the query range interval for an attribute) in each experiment. However, f (pi), the allowed posterior confidence of an attacker on SA value vi, grows as a function of β. A higher value of f (pi) implies a larger αi, allowing for a higher probability that an SA value remains intact after randomization. Therefore, the data utility rises as β grows (Figure 9(b) ). Next, we set β = 4, and vary QI size; Figure 9 (c) shows the results. As neither (ρ1i, ρ2i)-privacy nor Baseline modifies any QI value, the utility of perturbed data depends on the input data set. Therefore, the workload error does not change uniformly with QI size. Last, we study the effect of varying θ. When θ is larger, RSA also grows. Hence, more tuples satisfy the query, and the result becomes more accurate, as Figure 9(d) shows. Remarkably, in all presented cases, the accuracy of our perturbation-based scheme consistently outperforms that of the Baseline approach. 
RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS
We now discuss the resistance of our model and schemes to several types of attack proposed in the literature.
A minimality attack [31] applies when an algorithm populates ECs with tuples explicitly heeding to privacy considerations, making decisions "uniquely decided by the sensitive value of a particular tuple" [34] . BUREL decides first on EC dimensions, considering SA values alone. Then, it decides on the particular contents of each EC, independently of others, looking only at tuples' QI values and heeding to utility considerations; it does not decide whether to put a given tuple in one EC or another by looking at its SA value. This separation of tasks renders BUREL immune to minimality attacks. Furthermore, [7] has shown that the minimality attack can be easily averted even in the case of algorithms vulnerable to it.
A deFinetti attack [15] aims to learn the correlation between SA values and QI values by building a Bayesian network; it starts by assuming a random permutation to assign each SA value to a QI value in each EC, and builds a Naïve Bayes classifier out of all such assignments. Then it evaluates the permutation assigned to each EC, and generates an improved one, which is in turn used to update the classifier. This iterative procedure goes on until it converges. In other words, the classifier exploits divergences between the global information, as it appears in the whole published table, and local knowledge within each EC, to iteratively correct the SA to QI assignments within each EC. We deduce that, if this divergence is controlled, the success potential of the deFinetti attack can be correspondingly constrained. The β-likeness principle delimits exactly this divergence by a threshold β, hence constrains how much an attacker learns beyond the overall distribution in a published table. We thus argue that β-likeness curbs the deFinetti attack as the value of β prescribes. Intuitively, a lower β value allows for smaller divergences and hence lower success rate of the attack. We have defined β-likeness in a way that constrains positive, but not negative, information gain, as this is the cardinal need in most practical circumstances. Still, a deFinetti attack may also exploit negative divergences in order to construct its classifier. In case such concerns arise, our model can be straightforwardly extended to constrain negative divergences as well, and thereby further enhance its capacity to thwart such attacks.
Cormode [6] recently conducted an experimental study of the deFinetti attack on Anatomy [33] , an instantiation of ℓ-diversity, concluding that the attack is effective for small values of ℓ (2, 3, 4) . Still, as ℓ rises, the attack's success rate deteriorates. In particular, for ℓ = 5 the rate is below 50%, and when ℓ reaches 7 it falls below 30%. As the attack has so far only been implemented against Anatomy, presenting the privacy of data anonymized by BUREL in terms of ℓ-diversity is relevant in this context. The table on the right presents the t and ℓ values achieved in terms of t-closeness and ℓ-diversity, respectively, for the data sets published by β-likeness in the experiment of Figure 4 (a), with β set to 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; Avg ℓ (t) stands for the average diversity (closeness) for all the ECs. Notably, for reasonable values of β, ℓ assumes values no less than 6 for which the deFinetti attack's succsess rate is low. The hitherto discussed attacks are designed against generalization-based schemes. Our perturbation scheme is not vulnerable to them, as it involves no generalization. Moreover, as it randomizes each SA value independently, it is immune to corruption attacks [30] , in which an attacker who is already aware of the SA values of some individuals tries to infer that of a victim. Besides, our schemes assume the anonymized data are published only once, so as to prevent composition attacks [11] . Thwarting such attacks with republication under β-likeness is a problem orthogonal to our work.
Cormode [6] also suggests an attack on differential privacy based on a Naïve Bayes classifier. Such a classifier predicts the SA value of a tuple t with m QI-attribute values, tj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, as:
The gist of the attack lies in the fact that the conditional probabilities Pr[tj |vi] can be accurately learned based on noisy count query results extracted from differentially private data. While the noise in question conceals the contribution of any individual, its effect on the derived Pr[tj |vi] is relatively small [6] ; thus, the built classifier works almost as effectively as in the noiseless case, exploiting variations of Pr[tj |vi] values from their unconditional counterpart, Pr[tj ] to produce a non-trivial prediction ofv(t). On the other hand, β-likeness is defined in a way that explicitly bounds exactly the variation of these conditional probabilities from their unconditional counterpart. Specifically, by Bayes' rule, we get: 
For a given sensitive value vi ∈ V, Pr[vi] is the prior confidence in vi based on the global distribution of SA values, which we have hitherto denoted as pi, while Pr[vi|tj ] is the posterior confidence that β-likeness bounds by f (pi) = (1+min{β, −ln pi})·pi. Then β-likeness guarantees that Pr[tj |vi] ≤ (1+min{β, −ln pi})·Pr[tj ].
Thus, β-likeness bounds the conditional probabilities that the Naïve Bayes attack exploits, delimiting the extent to which their values vary from Pr[tj ]. Consequently, β-likeness delimits the potential for a Naïve Bayes attack to succeed, causing Equation (15) to predict the most frequent SA value in the table most of the time.
The preceding analysis has been made without prejudice to the publication format, and hence applies to any scheme satisfying βlikeness. However, the same analysis can be made specifically for publication by generalization. Assume BUREL outputs e ECs, and f of those include QI attribute value tj. Let {G1, . . . , G f } be the set of ECs that contain tj , {G f +1 , . . . , Ge} the set of all other ECs, and q k i the frequency of SA value vi in EC G k . Then it is: β Accuracy Naive Bayes
The last inequality confirms our previous result. For illustration, we estimate Pr[tj |vj ] values as in Equation (17) on the anonymized CENSUS data, using the first three attributes as QI, to predict the SA value of each tuple by Equation (15), for β ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We obtain the success rate shown in the figure above. As expected, this success rate remains remarkably close to the frequency of the most frequent SA value in the data, namely 4.8402%.
Last, we emphasize that β-likeness is a privacy model for categorical data. Its extension to numerical data is an interesting topic for future research. Such an extension should constrain not merely the variation in the frequencies of discrete numerical values, but rather of any values in close proximity to each other. Doing so, it would be immune to proximity attacks [19] , as they apply on numerical data. In case proximity is defined for categorical data by a semantic hierarchy of categorical values, our model can be easily extended so as to treat all values beneath the same selected nodes in this hierarchy as the same, and ensure β-likeness for such groups of values instead of leaf nodes in the hierarchy. We also emphasize that out model is built under the assumption that an attacker has no other prior knowledge apart from the overall distribution of sensitive values. Rastogi et al. [26] show that, if an adversary knows arbitrary correlations among tuples, there exists no useful anonymization algorithm that can achieve both privacy and utility.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we revisited the microdata anonymization problem with three distinct contributions. First, we introduced β-likeness, a robust privacy model that provides a comprehensible and intuitively appealing privacy guarantee, expressed as a limit on the relative confidence gain on each single sensitive attribute value. Second, we devised BUREL, a novel generalization algorithm explicitly customized for this model. Third, we devised a perturbation technique for our model. Our experimental results confirm that algorithms developed for other privacy models cannot achieve strong guarantees in terms of β-likeness, and verify the effectiveness and efficiency of both our schemes in their task. Apart from this experimental study, we also provided arguments and results to the effect that the β-likeness privacy guarantee affords genuine protection against attacks suggested in previous research. In the future, we intend to extend our model to numerical sensitive attributes.
